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EDUCATION LAW
D. Patrick Lacy, Jr. *
Kathleen S. Mehfoud **
I. CASE DECISIONS
This year saw a dearth of significant developments affecting
general education law in Virginia. Indeed, the most anticipated
case affecting public education this year, the constitutional chal-
lenge to the pledge of allegiance,' was perhaps the biggest disap-
pointment for those looking forward to further guidance on issues
relating to religion in public schools, because the Supreme Court
of the United States decided the case on procedural, rather than
constitutional, grounds.2 The Court did clarify a question that
had been plaguing higher education for twenty-five years-
whether Justice Powell's plurality opinion in Regents of the Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke3 was binding precedent-in a pair of
cases involving admissions to the University of Michigan and its
law school.4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, on the other hand, predictably brushed aside the Virginia
Military Institute's position that its "supper prayer" was not a
violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.'
On the legislative front, the General Assembly passed few laws
that are likely to bring about significant changes in public educa-
* Partner, Reed Smith LLP, Richmond, Virginia. A.B., 1966, Belmont Abbey College;
LL.B., 1969, University of Richmond School of Law.
** Partner, Reed Smith LLP, Richmond, Virginia. B.S., 1970, Mary Washington Col-
lege; M.C., 1974, University of Richmond; J.D., 1978, University of Richmond School of
Law.
1. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
2. See id. at 2312.
3. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
4. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003).
5. See Mellen v. Bunting 327 F.3d 355, 368-69, 371-72 (4th Cir. 2003).
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tion 6 -certainly nothing having the impact of the Standards of
Learning requirements7 or the No Child Left Behind Act.'
A. Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,9 the atheist fa-
ther of an elementary school student claimed that a requirement
that students recite the pledge of allegiance each day violated the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States.1" The father spe-
cifically complained about the use of the words "under God,"
which Congress added to the pledge in 1954." The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck down the pledge re-
quirement as violative of the Establishment Clause.12
The Supreme Court of the United States did not reach the First
Amendment issue that held the public interest. Rather, it re-
versed the Ninth Circuit's decision on the grounds that the father
lacked standing to challenge the school district policy in federal
court:
[Ilt is improper for the federal courts to entertain a claim by a plain-
tiff whose standing to sue is founded on family law rights that are in
dispute when prosecution of the lawsuit may have an adverse effect
on the person who is the source of the plaintiffs claimed standing. 
13
6. See Act of Apr. 15, 2004, ch. 967, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-3, -5, -270 (Supp. 2004)); Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 965, 2004 Va. Acts
- (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-4018 (Cum. Supp. 2004), 22.1-253.13:3,
13:6, 13:8 (Supp. 2004)); Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 560, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified at VA.
CODE ANN. § 22.1-277.07:1 (Supp. 2004)); Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 530, 2004 Va. Acts -
(codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-3109 (Cum. Supp. 2004), 22.1-212.5, .6, .8,
.9, .11, .12 (Supp. 2004)); Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 528, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified at VA.
CODE ANN. § 22.1-289.2 (Supp. 2004)); see also infra Part II.B (discussing statutory
changes in state law).
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-253.13:1 (Supp. 2004).
8. 20 U.S.C. § 6301-8962 (2000).
9. 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004). For further discussion of the case, see Robert E. Shepherd,
Jr., Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Family and Juvenile Law, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 241,
244-45 (2004).
10. Id. at 2305.
11. Id. at 2305-06.
12. Newdow v. United States Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 2002).
13. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2312.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas
filed separate opinions joining in the judgment of the Court, but
finding that the father had standing and that the pledge re-
quirement does not offend the Establishment Clause. 4 These
separate opinions did little to clarify the appropriate test to be
employed in resolving challenges under the religion clauses to
practices in the public education setting. Indeed, these opinions
illustrate the problem encountered in cases involving the religion
clauses-determining the appropriate test to apply to an Estab-
lishment or Free Exercise challenge.
In his opinion, in which Justice O'Connor joined, the Chief Jus-
tice asserted that the national culture in the United States "al-
lows public recognition of our Nation's religious history and
character,"15 citing numerous references to God in the official life
of the United States since the country's inception. 6 He contrasted
the pledge with the explicit religious exercise at issue in Lee v.
Weisman 7 and observed that the pledge is a patriotic exercise,
which is not converted into a religious exercise by the inclusion of
the phrase "under God.""
Justice O'Connor reaffirmed her view that the "endorsement
test" should be utilized to decide Establishment Clause chal-
lenges to government-sponsored speech and displays. 9 The en-
dorsement test asks "whether the ceremony or representation
would convey a message to a reasonable observer, familiar with
its history, origins, and context, that those who do not adhere to
its literal message are political outsiders."2" Justice O'Connor
concluded that the answer is no in this case.2' Relying on the role
of religion in the history of the nation and "the inevitable conse-
quence of our Nation's origins,"22 Justice O'Connor found the ref-
erences to God that appear in the pledge of allegiance, the na-
14. See id. at 2312-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id. at 2321-27 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring); id. at 2327-33 (Thomas, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 2319 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
16. Id. at 2317-19 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
17. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). The Court in Lee found that coercion existed where a prayer
was delivered at a high school graduation. Id. at 593.
18. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. at 2319-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
19. Id. at 2321 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 2326 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
21. See id. at 2323-27 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 2322 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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tional motto, the Star-Spangled Banner, and at the opening of
sessions of the Court to be "ceremonial deism," in which the gov-
ernment can "refer to the divine without offending the Constitu-
tion."23 Even the religious motivations by the legislators who in-
serted "under God" into the pledge did not make its recitation in
public school classrooms unconstitutional, because the continued
repetition of that phrase changed its cultural significance.24 Jus-
tice O'Connor also noted that such references to God had been
"employed pervasively without engendering significant contro-
versy,"25 that they did not refer to a particular religion,26 and that
the brevity of the reference to God distinguished the pledge from
the prayers and invocations at issue in prior cases before the
Court.27
Justice Thomas, on the other hand, opined that under Lee the
pledge requirement is unconstitutional, but that Lee was wrongly
decided.2" According to Justice Thomas, Lee incorrectly concluded
that peer pressure could constitute coercion under the religion
clauses.29 Rather, in his view, only the "'force of law and threat of
penalty' can constitute coercion sufficient to violate the Estab-
lishment Clause. Perhaps Justice Thomas's most far-reaching
pronouncement was that the Establishment Clause is not made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and
"is best understood as a federalism provision-it protects state es-
tablishments from federal interference but does not protect any
individual right."31 This view did not appear to gain a foothold
among any of the other justices.
In a case decided before Newdow, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, in Myers v. Loudoun
County School Board,32 had little difficulty disposing of First
Amendment challenges brought by the father of two elementary
23. Id. at 2322-23 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 2325 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 2324 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 2325-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 2326 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 2330 (Thomas, J., concurring).
29. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
30. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
31. Id. at 2331 (Thomas, J., concurring).
32. 251 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (E.D. Va. 2003).
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school students.33 The father challenged the Virginia statutes
that require the daily recitation of the pledge of allegiance and
the posting of the national motto, "In God We Trust," in public
schools.3 4 As noted by the court, the challenge to the pledge stat-
ute was somewhat unique because it was not based on the use of
the words "under God" in the pledge.35 Rather, the father objected
to the pledge statute because it created a "civil religion" that re-
quires students to worship the country or the flag.36 The court
noted that the concept of a civil religion, which the court equated
with ceremonial deism, has long been recognized, 3v "[b]ut no court
that has acknowledged the existence of a civil religion has ever
found that government sponsored activities that encourage patri-
otism violate the Establishment Clause."38 Moreover, a student is
not required to participate in the recitation of the pledge "'if he,
his parent or legal guardian objects on religious, philosophical or
other grounds to his participating in this exercise.' 39
Applying the test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, ° the district
court held that the statute did not violate the Establishment
Clause in four ways: (1) it has the secular purpose of fostering
and inspiring patriotism, love of country and respect for constitu-
tional principles;4' (2) it does not advance or inhibit religion be-
cause "the statute itself practically conveys no religious message,
and at most it conveys a message of government appreciation;"42
and (3) it does not foster an excessive government entanglement
with religion because the pledge is secular, not religious.43
The father also argued that the school's implementation of the
pledge statute violated the Free Exercise Clause because
"through a system of reward and punishment, the School effec-
tively coerce[d] participation in the pledge recitation."44 The al-
33. See id. at 1275-77.
34. Id. at 1264.
35. Id. at 1266.
36. Id. at 1266-67.
37. See id. at 1267-68.
38. Id. at 1268.
39. Id. at 1268 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-202(C) (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Supp. 2004)).
40. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
41. Myers, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1269.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1269-70.
44. Id. at 1270.
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leged reward was the distribution of Chick-Fil-A meal coupons to
students who displayed patriotism.4" The district court rejected
this argument, noting that students received the reward for en-
gaging in a number of patriotic exercises, and not solely the reci-
tation of the pledge.46 Therefore, the reward program was "neu-
tral and generally applicable" and did not violate the Free
Exercise Clause.47
According to the father, his children were punished for their re-
fusal to recite the pledge because: (1) students who stay seated
are disciplined until their parents make "an acceptable objection"
to their participation in the pledge; (2) his children must remain
seated during the pledge while all their classmates stand; (3) his
children are forced to listen to the pledge; and (4) he had not been
given an adequate opportunity to explain to his children's class-
mates why his children stay seated during the pledge. 4' The court
noted that the alleged punishment "is not similar to any of the
traditional punishments recognized as implicating constitutional
rights,"149 and held that it also did not rise to the level of violating
the Free Exercise Clause. °
In addition to his challenges to the pledge statute, the father
argued that the school's implementation of the motto statute vio-
lated the Establishment Clause because by using posters that
were supplied by a conservative religious group, "the School is ef-
fectively establishing a religion."5 Again, the father did not object
to the word "God" in the national motto, but he did request that
the court order the flag removed from the poster and that the
poster clearly state that "In God We Trust" is the national motto
and not a religious statement. The court rejected the father's
novel arguments and held that the donation of the posters by a
religious organization, regardless of its religious motivation, did




48. Id. at 1271. Apparently, the only argument the father did not make was that eat-
ing fast food is a form of punishment.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1273.
51. Id.
52. Id.




As noted earlier, the Supreme Court of the United States is-
sued two opinions clarifying the contours of affirmative action in
higher education. In Grutter v. Bollinger,54 a Caucasian applicant,
Barbara Grutter, who was denied admission to the University of
Michigan Law School, claimed that her application was rejected
because race was a "predominant factor" in the law school's ad-
missions decisions in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981."5
The law school's admissions policy "requires admissions offi-
cials to evaluate each applicant based on all the information
available in the file, including a personal statement, letters of
recommendation, and an essay describing the ways in which the
applicant will contribute to the life and diversity of the Law
School."56 The applicants' grade point averages and Law School
Admission Test scores are considered, but admissions officials are
to look beyond these factors to "applicants' talents, experiences,
and potential 'to contribute to the learning of those around
them.'"57 Diversity was considered in admissions decisions, but
was not defined "solely in terms of racial and ethnic status."" The
school did attempt to ensure that a "critical mass of underrepre-
sented minority students"59 was enrolled, but did not have a cer-
tain "number, percentage, or range of numbers or percentages
that constitute[d] [a] critical mass."60
54. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
55. Id. at 316-17. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states that "[n]o person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). Fur-
thermore, "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,... and to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is en-
joyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000).
56. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 316.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 318.
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The Court left no doubt regarding the viability of Justice Pow-
ell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.6
As Justice O'Connor expressed, "[Tioday we endorse Justice Pow-
ell's view that student body diversity is a compelling state inter-
est that can justify the use of race in university admissions."62
The Court also rejected the notion "that the only governmental
use of race that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying past dis-
crimination."63 After deferring to "[t]he Law School's educational
judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mis-
sion," " and finding "the Law School has a compelling interest in
attaining a diverse student body,"65 the Court turned to the ques-
tion of whether the admissions policy was narrowly tailored to
achieve its purpose.
The Court emphatically rejected the idea that an admissions
policy that uses a quota system can be narrowly tailored.66 In or-
der to pass muster, "a university may consider race or ethnicity
only as a "'plus' in a particular applicant's file, without 'insu-
lat[ing] the individual from comparison with all other candidates
for the available seats."'67 "The Law School's goal of attaining a
critical mass of underrepresented minority students does not
transform its program into a quota," 68 because, as stated by Jus-
tice Powell in Bakke, there is "'some relationship between num-
bers and achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse stu-
dent body, and between numbers and providing a reasonable
environment for those students admitted."'69 Accordingly, the
Court found the law school's admission policy to be narrowly tai-
lored to achieve its ends.7" While the Court upheld the policy, it
did qualify its holding by stating that the policy cannot last for-
ever, but must have a "termination point."7' The Court accepted
61. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
62. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
63. Id. at 328.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 334.
67. Id. (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978)).
68. Id. at 335-36.
69. Id. at 336 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323).
70. Id. at 334.
71. Id. at 342.
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the law school's pledge to terminate its race-based policy "as soon
as practicable."72
In Gratz v. Bollinger,73 the companion case to Grutter, two Cau-
casian applicants denied admission to the University of Michi-
gan's College of Literature, Science and the Arts claimed that the
university's consideration of race in its undergraduate admissions
decisions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42
U.S.C. § 1981(a).7 4 Although the university's admission guidelines
had changed several times prior to the institution of this case,75
the Court focused on the guidelines in effect at the time the case
was heard.76 Under those guidelines, admissions decisions were
made based on the number of points accumulated by the appli-
cant.77 Points were awarded "based on high school grade point av-
erage, standardized test scores, academic quality of an applicant's
high school, strength or weakness of high school curriculum, in-
state residency, alumni relationship, personal essay, and personal
achievement or leadership."" In addition, members of "an under-
represented racial or ethnic minority group" were awarded
twenty points under a miscellaneous category.7 9 "Underrepre-
sented minorities" were defined to include African Americans,
Hispanics, and Native Americans. °
Applicants with 100 or more points automatically gained ad-
mission." Therefore, the points awarded to underrepresented mi-
norities constituted twenty percent of the total points needed to
be guaranteed admission. Admissions personnel could also flag
applications to be individually reviewed by a committee if the ap-
plicant: (1) would not otherwise be automatically admitted, (2)
achieved a minimum number of points, (3) was academically pre-
pared to succeed at the university, and (4) had some quality or
72. Id. at 343.
73. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
74. Id. at 249-51.
75. Id. at 253.
76. Id. at 255-57.
77. Id. at 255.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 253-54.
81. Id. at 255.
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characteristic that would be valuable to the freshman class." The
university admitted virtually every qualified applicant from the
underrepresented minorities groups during the period of time
relevant to this litigation."
The Court struck down the undergraduate admissions program
because a system that automatically awards points based on race,
rather than simply considering race as a plus in an individualized
selection process, is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
interest in diversity.'M Undoubtedly, the university considered its
racial and ethnic minority selection program to be a positive addi-
tion to its admissions process. The Supreme Court, on the other
hand, was not enamored with the flagging program, finding that
it "only emphasizes the flaws of the University's system" because
individualized consideration is the exception rather than the
rule." The Court observed that this individualized attention oc-
curred only after the points were added to "make[ I race a decisive
factor for virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented
minority applicant."86 In addition, the Court dismissed the uni-
versity's argument that administrative challenges such as the
volume of applications, justify an otherwise constitutionally in-
firm admissions policy. 7
The Supreme Court's decisions in Gratz and Grutter have obvi-
ous implications for public institutions of higher education. Such
institutions have now been given a model to follow when estab-
lishing an admissions policy that takes an applicant's race into
consideration. It is doubtful, however, that the standards estab-
lished in the University of Michigan cases will be applicable to
public elementary and secondary schools. Most notably, K-12 in-
stitutions normally do not have applicants, at least not in the
model of higher education. At least one commentator has noted
that the contexts of a university admissions policy and K-12 inte-
gration have significant differences and, therefore, may not war-
rant identical treatment. 8
82. Id. at 256-57.
83. Id. at 254.
84. Id. at 275.
85. Id. at 273.
86. Id. at 274.
87. Id. at 273-75.
88. See James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence in Modern
[Vol. 39:183
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
considered two cases that involved race-based admissions in the
K-12 context.8 9 It is unlikely that the outcomes in those cases
would have been different had the cases been decided after the
Gratz and Grutter decisions. In Eisenberg v. Montgomery County
Public Schools,9 ° a white student's application to transfer to the
county's math and science magnet program was denied based
upon the school's diversity profile.91 In Tuttle v. Arlington County
School Board,92 a magnet school used a weighted lottery system
to increase the representation of racial minorities in the school.93
In both Eisenberg and Tuttle, the schools failed to provide indi-
vidualized consideration to the applicant or to use race as merely
a plus factor. 94 Thus, even after Gratz and Grutter, it is unlikely
that the policies in Eisenberg and Tuttle would be considered nar-
rowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.
C. Special Education
Special education disputes continue to be a source for litigation
in matters arising under the Individuals with Disabilities Educa-
tion Act ("IDEA"),9" and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.96 Recent
cases dealt with issues of tuition reimbursement for private
schools,97 procedural compliance,9" extended school year ser-
vices,99 notice requirements, 1° and "stay-put" provisions.'01 Cases
decided within the Fourth Circuit also reaffirmed the judicial
Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1659, 1687 (2003).
89. See Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. 1019 (2000); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir.
1999), cert. dismissed, 529 U.S. 1050 (2000).
90. 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999).
91. Id. at 124-25.
92. 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999).
93. Id. at 702.
94. See Eisenburg, 197 F.3d at 130-31; Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 707.
95. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (2000).
96. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2000).
97. See A.B. v. Lawson, 354 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 2004); County Sch. Bd. v. Palkovics,
285 F. Supp. 2d 701 (E.D. Va. 2003).
98. See Lawson, 354 F.3d 315; Palkovics, 285 F. Supp. 2d 701.
99. See Palkovics, 285 F. Supp. 2d 701.
100. See R.R. v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 338 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2003); Smith v. Isle of
Wight County Sch. Bd., 284 F. Supp. 2d 370 (E.D. Va. 2003).
101. See Wagner v. Bd. of Educ., 335 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 2003).
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standard of review for an individualized education program
("IEP")10 2 and the precept that deference must be afforded to pub-
lic school educators when they make educational determina-
tions. 3 These significant recent holdings are analyzed in the fol-
lowing discussion.
1. FAPE, Private Placement, Tuition Reimbursement, and ESY
Services
In A.B. v. Lawson, °4 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit considered a parent's request for tuition reim-
bursement for a placement in a private school and ultimately de-
nied reimbursement.' 5 The Fourth Circuit's opinion reaffirmed
the notion that deference must be given to the educational judg-
ments of public educators.0 6 The court agreed that "'once educa-
tion authorities have made a professional judgment about the
substantive content of a child's IEP, that judgment must be re-
spected. '""' 7 The court also discussed the standard for reviewing
an IEP.'0 8 The court reaffirmed that the student's IEP provided
the student with a free appropriate public education ("FAPE")
and satisfied IDEA requirements if the IEP was reasonably calcu-
lated to provide the student with some educational benefit.109 The
Fourth Circuit clarified that an IEP was not required to replicate
a private school program"0 or "'maximize' a student's poten-
tial.""' The correct standard for review of an IEP is whether the
student could obtain some educational benefit in the public school
program. 112
Undergirding all of [the parent's] arguments are [their] claims that
because [their child], a child of above-average IQ, was not fulfilling
102. Lawson, 354 F.3d at 328-30.
103. Id. at 326.
104. 354 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 2004).
105. Id. at 318, 332.
106. See id. at 325.
107. Id. at 326 (quoting Tice v. Botetourt County Sch. Bd., 908 F.2d 1200, 1208 (4th
Cir. 1990)).
108. See id. at 328-30.
109. Id. at 326-28.
110. Id. at 328.
111. Id. at 327 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 189 (1982)).
112. See id. at 328-30.
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his potential within a general education setting-and, in contrast, al-
legedly was "thriving" and "getting the help he needs" at the [private
school]-[the public school system] was not in compliance with
IDEA. Although,... nowhere does IDEA require that a school sys-
tem "maximize" a student's potential.
1 13
The case affirms three important principles under IDEA. First,
the expertise of public school educators must be granted defer-
ence." 4 Second, IDEA does not require that a public school maxi-
mize a student's potential, but rather requires that the student
obtain some benefit from a public education." 5 Finally, the case
reaffirmed the position that a public school is not required to du-
plicate a program provided by a private school." 6
The Fourth Circuit also considered in G v. Fort Bragg Depend-
ent Schools"' the application of IDEA to a school operated by the
federal government."' Although the case was remanded, the
court found that the federal FAPE standard articulated by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Board of Education v.
Rowley" 9 governed the student's IEP and not North Carolina's
"full potential" standard.20 The Fourth Circuit also determined
for the first time that compensatory education services were
available to remedy the failure of a school division to provide
FAPE.12'
As noted previously, courts continue to affirm that judgments
of public school educators are due deference. In County School
Board v. Palkovics,"' the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia reviewed the parents' unilateral
placement of an autistic student in a private school and their re-
sulting request for tuition reimbursement.'23 The district court
found "while expert testimony may be relevant, reviewing offi-
cials should not second-guess the educational judgments of school
113. Id. at 327 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189).
114. Id. at 326. This position was also affirmed in a district court opinion, County
School Board v. Palkovics, 285 F. Supp. 2d 701, 706-08 (E.D. Va. 2003).
115. Lawson, 354 F.3d at 319, 327.
116. Id. at 328.
117. 343 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2003).
118. Id. at 298-99.
119. 458 U.S. at 190-205 (1982).
120. Fort Bragg Dependent Schs., 343 F.3d at 306.
121. Id. at 308-09.
122. 285 F. Supp. 2d 701 (E.D. Va. 2003).
123. Id. at 703-04.
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employees."'24 The court also held that schools are entitled to
have a reasonable time period in which to determine whether ex-
tended school year ("ESY") services are required and that the
need for ESY services does not have to be determined by any par-
ticular date.125 Likewise, the school was found not to have an ob-
ligation to establish a behavioral intervention plan ("BIP") by any
particular date because IDEA regulations do not require the in-
clusion of a BIP until a student's behavior impedes his own learn-
ing or the learning of others.'26 Finally, the court held that a pro-
cedural violation of IDEA was not significant unless the violation
denied FAPE."7 In this case, the school's failure to check the as-
sessment methods on four of the annual goals did not prevent the
student from receiving FAPE from the pubic school program. 2 '
Not only is the ESY holding of Palkovics a fair reading of the
statute, as neither IDEA nor its regulations require that ESY
services be determined by a particular time, but the holding is
appropriate from a practical perspective. ESY services by defini-
tion are provided in the summer, and it is often unknown
whether ESY services will be appropriate when the IEP is drafted
earlier in the school year. By allowing the school officials the
flexibility of determining ESY services later in the school year,
school officials may more accurately determine whether ESY ser-
vices are appropriate and which services are needed.
2. Statute of Limitations and Notice Requirements
The Fourth Circuit considered in R.R. v. Fairfax County School
Board29 the issue of whether IDEA requires educational agencies
in Virginia to provide notice to parents of the limitations period
applicable to requests for a due process hearing. 3 ° The parent
filed for a due process hearing, requesting reimbursement for the
student's private school tuition expenses.1 3' The hearing request
was filed over twenty-nine months after the parent had rejected
124. Id. at 707-08.
125. Id. at 708-09.
126. Id. at 709.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 338 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2003).
130. Id. at 327.
131. Id. at 328.
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the school's proposed IEP and withdrawn the student from
school. 32 The court held that IDEA did not require the school
board to provide the parents with notice of Virginia's two-year
statutory limitations period.133 In reaching its conclusion, the
Fourth Circuit considered that courts that have adopted very
short limitations periods have often imposed notice requirements;
however, where courts have adopted longer limitations periods,
such as Virginia's two-year period, notice requirements have not
been imposed.
134
3. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
In Power v. School Board,135 the parents initiated a suit alleg-
ing that the school board's procedural policies violate Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Section 504")136 by not provid-
ing adequate safeguards. 13 7 The parents did not make any allega-
tions of discrimination by the school board on account of a disabil-
ity. 3' In dismissing the claim, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia held that there was no private
cause of action to enforce section 504's regulatory due process
provision. 139 Section 504 "does not provide for a cause of action to
assert a claim for procedural inadequacy, separate and apart
from a claim of discrimination." 14 Because there was no private
right of action, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
the case.' Simply stated, the court held that parents cannot
challenge a school division's Section 504 procedures absent a
claim of discrimination.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 330-31.
134. Id. at 331-32; see, e.g., CM v. Bd. of Educ., 241 F.3d 374, 383-84 (4th Cir. 2001)
(holding that a North Carolina statute granting a 60-day limitations period was consistent
with IDEA policies because the statute contained a notice requirement); Strawn v. Miss.
State Bd. of Ed., 210 F.3d 954, 957-58 (8th Cir. 2000) (refusing to impose a notice re-
quirement with a two-year limitations period).
135. 276 F. Supp. 2d 515 (E.D. Va. 2003).
136. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
137. Power, 276 F. Supp. at 518.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 519.
140. Id. at 520.
141. Id. at 521-22.
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Another federal district court case examined Section 504 and
its provisions in Smith v. Isle of Wight County School Board.142 In
dismissing the Section 504 claim as untimely, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that both
the one-year statute of limitations and "the 180-day notice re-
quirement contained in the Virginia Rights of Persons with Dis-
abilities Act 4' applie[d] to claims brought pursuant to § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act."144 Likewise, the court found that the
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were barred by the two-year stat-
ute of limitations for personal injuries.'45 The court held that the
cause of action alleging failure to place the student in a special
education class accrued when the decision was made not to place
the student in special education.
146
The holding in Smith-that the 180-day notice requirement in
the Virginia Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act applies to
claims pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act' 47-is
significant. If a student or parent is going to bring a claim against
a school board under Section 504, the school board must be pro-
vided with the statutory notice of the alleged violation within 180
days of the alleged violation.
4. The Stay-Put Provision
IDEA requires that a student with a disability "stay-put" in the
current placement during any dispute:
Except as provided in subsection (k)(7) of this section, during the
pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this sectioa,
unless the State or local educational agency and the parents other-
142. 284 F. Supp. 2d 370 (E.D. Va. 2003).
143. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 51.5-40 to -46(B) (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2004). The Vir-
ginia Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act states in relevant part:
An action may be commenced pursuant to this section any time within one
year of the occurrence of any violation of rights under this chapter. However,
such action shall be forever barred unless such claimant or his agent, attor-
ney or representative has commenced such action or has filed by registered
mail a written statement of the nature of the claim with the potential defen-
dant or defendants within 180 days of the occurrence of the alleged violation.
Id. § 51.5-46(B) (Repl. Vol. 2002 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
144. Smith, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 376.
145. Id. at 378.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 376.
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wise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational
placement of such child, or, if applying for initial admission to a pub-
lic school, shall, with the consent of the parents, be placed in the
public school program until all such proceedings have been com-
pleted. 
148
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ad-
dressed this provision in Wagner v. Board of Education.149 The
child's placement was no longer available, and as a result, there
was no placement to which the child could be ordered to stay-
put.1"' "Ordering the child to enter an alternative placement, as
the district court did here, causes the child not to remain in his or
her then-current educational placement, a result that contra-
vene[d] the statutory mandate.... ,,5 Thus, this case holds that
there is no stay-put placement for a student when the placement
is no longer available, but that a new placement may be judicially
ordered if proper grounds for a preliminary injunction are estab-
lished."2
II. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY CHANGES
A. Changes in Federal Law
There was a change in the federal regulations implementing
the No Child Left Behind Act'53 which affects special education:
In calculating adequate yearly progress for schools, LEAs, and the
State, a State-
(i) Must, consistent with § 200.7(a), include the scores of all students
with disabilities, even those with the most significant cognitive dis-
abilities; but
(ii) May include the proficient and advanced scores of students with
the most significant cognitive disabilities based on the alternate
academic achievement standards in § 200.1(d), provided that the
number of those students who score at the proficient or advanced
level on those alternate achievement standards at the LEA and at
148. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2000).
149. 335 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 2003).
150. Id. at 301.
151. Id. at 301-02.
152. Id. at 302-03.
153. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-8962 (2000).
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the State levels, separately, does not exceed 1.0 percent of all stu-
dents in the grades assessed in reading/language arts and in
mathematics. 154
The new regulations permit a state or local educational agency
("LEA") to use alternate achievement standards to evaluate stu-
dents with the most significant cognitive disabilities for adequate
yearly progress ("AYP").'55 The regulations do not define "stu-
dents with the most significant cognitive disabilities," and, there-
fore, the states and LEAs appear to have greater latitude in iden-
tifying the population of students that should be evaluated using
alternative standards. The regulations further provide that for
purposes of achieving AYP, the LEA and the state may give equal
weight to the proficient and advanced scores achieved by the use
of these alternate achievement standards as is given to the scores
of those students who take the standard assessment.1 5 The num-
ber of proficient scores based on the alternate standards was
capped at one percent of all the students tested at that grade
level.157 It should be noted that this one percent cap does not limit
the number of students who may take an alternate assessment.
5 8
It limits only the number of proficient and advanced scores that
can be counted toward AYP goals.159 Obviously, this cap creates a
disincentive for large numbers of students to be approved for al-
ternate assessments. If a large number of students are exempted
through the IEP process, a school division will have a problem
meeting the No Child Left Behind requirements. 6 ° Under IDEA,
the IEP team continues to make the decision regarding the need
for an alternate assessment. 161
The one percent cap was placed on alternative assessments to
prevent an unwarranted number of students from participating
in such assessments and thereby evading the accountability cen-
tral to No Child Left Behind.'62 The United States Department of
Education anticipates that by limiting the number of students





158. Id. at 68,706.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 68,704
161. See 29 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(v)(II) (2000).
162. 68 Fed. Reg. at 68,704.
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that may achieve proficient scores toward AYP goals through al-
ternate assessments, more special education students will be di-
rected toward the general curriculum in an effort to prepare the
special education students for the general state-wide assess-
ments. 
163
B. Changes in State Law
There were few significant education-related bills passed by
the 2004 Session of the General Assembly. It enacted portions of
the Charter School Excellence and Accountability Act, which sub-
stantially revised charter school law.'64 For the first time, the Vir-
ginia Board of Education was directly inserted into the charter
school process. 6 ' Persons wishing to file an application to operate
a charter school may first submit it to the Board of Education for
review and comment.166 If an applicant takes advantage of this
opportunity, it must include the Board's comments when it sub-
mits the application to the local school board.'67 The General As-
sembly also eliminated the cap on the number of charter schools a
school board may approve, 168 eliminated the requirement that
half of the charter schools in a school division must serve at-risk
students, 169 and extended the maximum term of a charter from
three to five years.7 0
The General Assembly also authorized the Board of Education
to require local school boards to submit and implement corrective
action plans to address the failure of individual schools to imple-
ment the Standards of Quality and to seek court enforcement
should a school board fail to develop or implement the corrective
action plan."' In response to an opinion of the Attorney General
that cast doubt on the authority of local school boards to adopt
163. Id. at 68,706.
164. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 530, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 2.2-3109 (Cum. Supp. 2004), 22.1-212.5,.6,.8,.9,_ 11, .12 (Supp. 2004)).
165. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-212.9(C) (Supp. 2004).
166. Id.
167. Id. § 22.1-212.8(C) (Supp. 2004).
168. Id. § 22.1-212.11(A) (Supp. 2004).
169. Id.
170. Id. § 22.1-212.12(A) (Supp. 2004).
171. Act of Apr. 15, 2004, ch. 965, 2004 Va. Acts -, (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 2.2-4018 (Cum. Supp. 2004), 22.1-253.13:3, .13:6, .13:8 (Supp. 2004)).
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student discipline policies prohibiting the possession of any type
of firearm on school property or at school sponsored events, 17 2 the
General Assembly passed legislation "declaratory of existing law"
clarifying that school boards may prohibit the possession of fire-
arms by students, even if such possession would not constitute a
crime. 17 3 In an effort to ease the burden on the children of persons
called upon to engage in the war on terrorism as members of the
military, the General Assembly passed legislation to make school
enrollment more flexible.'74 School boards are now required to
permit a student who is living with a person pursuant to a special
power of attorney executed by a custodial parent deployed outside
the United States to attend, tuition free, either the schools in the
school division in which that person resides or, when practicable,
in which the custodial parent resides, at the option of the stu-
dent. 75 Also, school boards are required to supplement the pay of
full-time employees called to active duty in the regular armed
forces of the United States or the National Guard or other reserve
component. 7 6 The amount and duration of the supplement, how-
ever, are left entirely to the discretion of the school board.77
172. Op. to Hon. Kevin G. Miller (Oct. 15, 2003), available at http://www.oag.state.
va.us (last visited Sept. 24, 2004).
173. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 560, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-
277.07:1 (Supp. 2004)).
174. Act of Apr. 15, 2004, ch. 967, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 22.1-3, 22.1-5, -270 (Supp. 2004)).
175. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-3(2) (Supp. 2004).
176. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 528, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-
289.2 (Supp. 2004)).
177. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-289.2 (Supp. 2004).
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